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POLICY AND THE TRANS-ATLANTIC RELATIONSHIP
ALISTER JOHN MISKIMMON
This article analyses recent developments in European Union (EU) security policy
and their implications for Germany's bilateral relations with France, the United
Kingdom and the United States of America. It contends that the development of a
greater EU security capability has significantly affected Germany's bilateral relations
with the USA and Germany's main European partners. This has resulted in a recasting
of the previous transatlantic security bargains of the Cold War period. Greater
expectations on behalf of France and the UK concerning German involvement in
military security within the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP)
have also affected Germany's approach to security policy-making.
INTRODUCTION 1
Since 1998 and in particular since the moves made by Britain towards a more active role in
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Union's capacity to act in the
sphere of foreign and security policy has made rapid advances. The United States' growing
reluctance to carry the main burden for security provision for its European allies means that
Europe can no longer afford not to act as one in its security requirements. For Germany, as for
France and the United Kingdom, this would entail taking over major responsibilities from the
United States in crisis management and consequently being confronted with new challenges
in security co-operation. The new demands placed on Germany in security provision may
create more problems for the Red/Green coalition than for its major European partners. Where
does Germany envisage the course of European security co-operation leading and what will
Germany do to flesh out existing conceptions of the CFSP? In this connection, how is
Germany translating its national interests in this field into EU policy through the process of
co-ordination and bargaining with the other 14 member states? These are highly pertinent
questions in German policy-making circles at present and must be considered in the light of
the changing geopolitical dynamics on the European continent. This article will begin by
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outlining the historical development of Germany's role in European security before going on
to analyse Germany's relations with its major partners and recent events in Europe affecting
transatlantic security relations.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO GERMANY'S ROLE IN EUROPEAN SECURITY
The Post-War Security Bargain
The post-war security bargain which emerged in the immediate years after 1945 was based on
material and ideational factors. The material factors enforcing the emergent transatlantic
security bargain in the Federal Republic were plain to see, notably the stationing of Allied
troops on German soil and, more importantly, the extension of American guarantees to
provide a nuclear shield against the Soviet threat. The Washington Treaty signed in 1949 laid
down the commitment of the Allied powers to safeguard the peace of Western Europe. The
succession of West Germany to NATO in 1955 marked an acceptance of Adenauer's belief in
the rationale of integration into the West, the welcoming of the Federal Republic back into the
Western state system and the recognition by West Germany of the primacy of the United
States in the security provision of Western Europe. Whilst military hardware was the visible
sign of the commitment of West Germany and its major partners to a system of co-operative
security, the clear visibility of the Soviet threat and the commitment to a democratic order
were the cohesive forces which held NATO together.
German post-war foreign policy was based on a series of bargains struck by Germany
in order to re-establish itself and insert itself into the international system. These were
founded on Bonn's commitment to Westbindung (Western integration). Central to this bargain
was NATO. This was a result of the mutual security need felt by both West Germany and the
other allies in the face of the Warsaw Pact. This not only secured West Germany's security
but also provided the basis for the post-war recovery of the German state. This post-war
bargain was not, however, a one-way process. The multifaceted bargain ensured German
recovery, but also provided the allies with a strong defensive bulwark against the East. The
central argument of this paper, however, is that, with the end of the Cold War period, the
security bargains are in the process of being recast. The bombing of Serbia and Kosovo
marked a turning point in US-EU relations. The United States is now demanding greater
Western European involvement in European regional security. This expectation has had major
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repercussions on Franco-German and British-German security co-operation within the
European Union.
The development of norms and the ensuing socialisation of national elites into shared
beliefs based on sustained mutual co-operation during the Cold War were instrumental in the
longevity of the transatlantic security bargain.2 West Germany's increasing reliance on
multilateral security arrangements in the face of the huge military forces gathered on its
borders presented West Germans with salient reasons for membership of co-operative security
structures based on the presence on the USA. The hard security guarantees that could be
offered only by the United States resulted in the predominance of the USA in NATO and
placed limitations on Western Europe's ability to conduct a distinctive diplomatic policy.
As Hoffmann contends, Germany has not departed from its reliance on
multilateralism, but this reliance is now founded on a more assertive Germany, less inhibited
by its past and the international environment. 3 This shift has had a major impact on the
development of EU security structures in which Germany seeks to play a leading role. The
underlying security bargain which Germany struck with the United States - that of the nuclear
shield and hard security provisions  remains. However, a more assertive, self-confident
Berlin has incrementally sought to influence the future course of European security policy
according to its own ideals and tied to the goal of eventual Political Union with its European
partners.
Germany and the development of European Union Security Policy
There are or have been three main reasons for German policy-makers to consider the
development of a European foreign policy to be in the best interests of Germany. First,
Germany's support for the European Political Co-operation (EPC)/CFSP process was a means
to counteract the deficiencies in German Foreign policy.4 Second, the growing confrontational
aspect of the Cold War during the late 1970s and early 1980s necessitated the development of
a distinctive European 'voice' in the international system. Subsequently, the post-Cold War
European system has seen a 'collapse of illusions' regarding the future role and interests of the
US in European regional security concerns. Finally, Germany has viewed the extension of co-
operation in foreign and security policy among EU member states as a furtherance of the
integration process. CFSP can be viewed as an area of the European integration process where
Germany continues to play the role of Musterknabe (the best pupil in the class).
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The function of NATO in the foreign and security policy of West Germany was
limited in the field of diplomacy. Moreover, the 'inability of Europeans significantly to
influence the course of events and the nakedness of its exposure to external aggression was
nowhere more keenly felt than in the German Foreign Ministry'.5 It was important for Bonn to
develop channels for pursuing policies which did not impact directly on the East/West
conflict. EPC provided an invaluable opportunity for the pursuit of Bonn's foreign policy
objectives. Membership of EPC provided an outlet for German diplomacy while
multilateralising it to prevent any suspicions of a German Sonderweg arising. Germany
actively pursued the process of European integration, most notably in the Genscher-Colombo
proposals of 12 November 1981 to deepen integration and bring EPC into the EC process,
with the aim of developing a common defence. EPC provided Germany with the first tentative
means for the expression of Bonn's diplomatic interests. In addition, German leaders and
foreign policy officials were worried by what they diagnosed as a waning of the commitment
of the German people to European integration, and the need - not just in Germany, but also in
the rest of Europe - to raise European ambition and reconfirm the loyalty of the member states
to the community ideal.6 Most importantly, EPC provided West Germany with an important
'alibi function' which served as a 'means of deflecting external pressure, and cover for shifts in
national policy.'7 NATO could not be used as a forum for expressing Germany's singular
foreign policy interests because of the sensitive nature of the Cold War and the intention not
to upset the close transatlantic relationship.
West Germany's attempts to create a European security policy were very much reliant
on the support of the United Kingdom and France, the major Western European military
powers. The constraints on West Germany's military capacity, embodied in the modified
Western European Union Treaty of 1954 with its restrictions on the development of ABC
(Atomic, Biological and Chemical) weapons, accounted for the notable modesty of German
security policy. However, despite the Federal Republic's relative aversion to military security,
beyond that of national defence, it scored a number of diplomatic successes through the
Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and Chancellor Schmidt's
successful efforts to include Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) negotiations in the
NATO agenda in the late 1970s.8
Chancellor Kohl pushed for foreign and security policy integration at Maastricht very
much as a way of deepening Germany's commitment to the European integration process. The
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German government also viewed the closer ties between the West European Union (WEU)
and the EU as a way of legitimising defence in the post-Cold War environment and as a way
of influencing the debate concerning German participation in 'out-of-area operations'.9 The
development of the CFSP must be viewed in the context of the continued German
commitment to European integration post-unification, at a time when Germany's future
commitment to multilateralism was coming under scrutiny. German attempts to move forward
foreign and security policy integration were not considered to be an open challenge to
American involvement in Europe as a 'common defence was considered a very long-term
process'.10 The only circumstances in which a common European defence could be
envisaged would be if the United States ever questioned its commitment to European security,
something that seems unimaginable in the foreseeable future.
The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks agreed by the WEU in June 1992 into the Treaty
of Amsterdam marked an important step forward in European security policy. The inclusion
of Article J.7(2) to include 'humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of
combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking' was a bold step which clarified
to some extent the relationship between the WEU and the EU, without suggesting a fusion.
However, this has also placed much greater demands and expectations on CFSP.  With the
coming into force of Article J.7(2) through the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty in May
1999, the 'capabilities-expectations' gap11 could no longer be fudged. Hence the Bremen
Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers that took place on 10 and 11 May 1999
expressed the willingness of the European nations to strengthen European operational
capabilities for Petersberg Tasks based on appropriate decision-making bodies and effective
military means, within NATO or national and multinational means outside the NATO
framework..12
             The inclusion of the Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP presents Germany, France and
the UK with major commitments spanning a wide range of military operations. The decisions
made at the Cologne Summit in June 1999 and at Helsinki in December 1999 represent
positive strides to meet these commitments. For Germany in particular, the inclusion of the
Petersberg Tasks demands a more interventionist German style within the CFSP and means
that Germany is no longer able to shirk responsibility in military operations.
GERMAN POLITICS6
Germany has aimed for Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) to be partially extended to
questions concerning the CFSP. Opportunities for the use of QMV procedures were agreed at
in the Treaty of Amsterdam in an attempt to facilitate CFSP decisions and to create the option
of coalitions of the willing conducting missions under EU auspices13 and leaving room for
'constructive abstention'. Despite this, Germany's stance on QMV exhibits ambivalence, as
between federalist and intergovernmentalist conceptions of security integration. Germany also
pressed for the appointment of a High Representative for CFSP at Amsterdam to give the EU
a more visible face and point of contact in world affairs, a post which has now been filled by
former NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana Madariaga. Significantly, the final decision to
appoint Solana was taken at the Cologne European Council meeting on 3 and 4 June 1999.
According to Sjursen, 'the internalisation of a European dimension of foreign policy is
most advanced and explicit in Germany, where it forms part of the overall strategy of
reflexive multilateralism.'14 This highlights the distinctive German approach to European
integration in which policy-makers span the divide between European and domestic level
forums and there is a cross-fertilisation of norms and policies in a two-way process. Although
the same processes can be recognised in France and UK, albeit in a much more restricted
sense, Germany's main partners are characterised by what has been described as 'nationalistic
internationalism', in which policy-makers seek to 'exploit' multilateral institutions for their
own national interest.15 This would equate with the neo-liberal institutionalist paradigm. In
Germany, the European project has blurred the divide between what is domestic and what is
foreign policy, highlighting the success of Germany's integration. Hill and Wallace have
noted the 'transformationalist effects' that the interaction between policy-makers has had on
traditional foreign policy-making practices.16
Germany has been profoundly affected by involvement in multilateral institutions. Its
commitment to institutions has been described as 'exaggerated multilateralism'.17 Garton-Ash
states that the Federal Republic was particularly interested in, and became increasingly adept
at, not clearly articulating distinctive national positions, but rather feedings its own special
German concerns and priorities into a common approach.18
            Germany's embeddedness within the EU has reinforced a Europeanist outlook among
Germany's foreign policy elites. Central to Germany's overall multilateralist strategy has been
the maintenance of close bilateral relations. Significant injections of dynamism into the
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integration process have resulted primarily from bilateral endeavours between the Federal
Republic and its major European partners, most significantly with France. These bilateral
relationships will now be examined.
SECURITY RELATIONS WITH FRANCE, THE UK AND THE USA
Franco-German Security Relations
The end of World War Two represented a watershed in relations between France and
Germany. It was clear that co-operation between the two Western European powers was
crucial for the future peace and prosperity of the continent. The development of Adenauer's
Westbindung was therefore reliant on close Franco-German relations. The Elysée Treaty of 22
January 1963 was a culmination of efforts since 1945 to construct close Franco-German ties.19
It committed both parties to strengthen bilateral ties through co-operation on defence issues
and also co-operation within the fledgling European Community structures. The Franco-
German Treaty of 1988 further elaborated on the Elysée Treaty by establishing the Franco-
German Defence and Security Council.20 Franco-German security consultation takes an
institutionalised form based on two underlying aims: first, to prevent the return of military
aggression between the two states and, second, to establish a dominant partnership as the
'engine' of European integration, based on the desire to control Germany within the EC with
France providing the policy leads, while Germany provided the economic might.
In the day-to-day business of EU politics, the Franco-German 'co-ordination reflex' results
in the tightly knit working relationship which exists at all levels between the two countries.
Bulmer et al. posit that the relationship with France established a settled German preference
for strategic partnerships based on a long-term commitment to a strategic project rather than
growing out of agreement on a range of technical interests.'21 The highly institutionalised
bilateral relationship between France and Germany has been described by Thomas Pederson
as one of 'co-operative hegemony' in which they have been able to secure policy preferences
in tandem through a process of close co-operation and through the use of 'side payments' to
other Member States.22 Pederson's argument is generally highly persuasive, but it does not
provide an adequate explanation of CFSP, where the Franco-German relationship does not
dominate to the same extent as in other policy fields. The major difference which exists
between the two states in European security policy concerns France's aim of creating
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L'Europe puissance, a powerful Europe more autonomous of the US than at present.
However, despite sporadic differences within the Franco-German relationship, the two sides
have remained broadly united on the strategic goals of European security policy, largely due
to the interwovenness of defence consultations between the two states.
British-German Security Relations
The UK's ability to impact on the EU has been highly circumscribed by the Franco-German
hard core, despite the recent attempt to shift the balance with the Blair-Schröder Paper.23
However, in security relations the British-German relationship has been positive due to their
close functional interdependence within NATO. The UK has been able to exert considerable
influence and prise open the almost exclusive Franco-German 'hard core' in the area of CFSP.
The UK's experience and practical expertise in military intervention is likely to ensure it a
central role in any future EU military forces. The introduction of EMU and the resulting
marginalisation of Britain in the EU's major policy area has made the UK's high-profile stance
in the development of ESDP all the more significant.
The UK has adopted a generally guarded stance towards the Franco-German-led
Eurocorps. 24 However, at the Anglo-French Summit before the Helsinki European Council
meeting, the UK showed signs of adopting a more positive attitude toward the Eurocorps.25
British participation in the Eurocorps also represents an area where the UK can play a major
role without, in its terms, 'sacrificing' further sovereignty, as co-operation in the Eurocorps
resembles that which exists within the (intergovernmental) NATO. Britain's more
interventionist attitude towards military engagement was reflected in the UK's 1998 Strategic
Defence Review, the aim of which was to outline the future scope of structure of the armed
forces according to strategic imperatives rather than financial constraints.26
German and British policy-makers have been united in the understanding that the EU
must develop a more coherent foreign policy, but the idea of progressing from this to a
common defence has often met with British intransigence. The acceptance of the need for an
independent crisis reaction capability by British elites has developed in the wake of the ethnic
conflict in Kosovo and because of America's reluctance to continue to carry the buck in
matters of European regional security. Thränert also posits that renewed British interest in
CESDP is the result of wanting to bolster Britain's European standing to strengthen its hand
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with the USA, to increase Europes international status, and to prevent any attempt by France
to weaken the transatlantic link.27
Franco-British Security Co-operation
The primacy of Franco-British security relations within the EU is grounded in
intergovernmental approaches to European security co-operation and is cemented by their
status as permanent representatives on the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Furthermore, the extensive post-colonial ties which France and the UK maintain in Africa and
other parts of the world give their diplomacy a 'world reach' that Germany has lacked. The
Franco-British security partnership has been vital for the renaissance of CFSP since 1998. The
Letter of Intent (LOI) on defence co-operation and the declaration on European security
signed at Saint Malo in December 1998 by Defence Ministers Robertson and Richard injected
a vital dynamism into CFSP. As well as committing both governments to improve the quality
of defence co-operation and troop deployment, the LOI strengthens co-operation in the fields
of operations, logistics, intelligence, civil/military affairs, media handling, personnel and
liaison.28 The positive impact of bilateral relationships involving France, Germany and the
UK  in European security results from the lack of exclusivity in these relations. While one eye
is always cast on strengthening bilateral co-operation and transparency, the other is
continually focused on the impact of such co-operation on other EU member states. The
Franco-British tandem in military security affairs is critical due to the military expertise which
both states possess and demonstrate in international operations.
The USA's Commitment to Atlanticism and the emergence of the European Security and Defence Identity.
America continues to regard Europe as its most important ally. Geipel posits four key
ingredients of the American commitment to Europe: hard economic interests, moral purpose,
cultural affinity, and, decisively, the sheer political will of American elites, although since the
fall of the Berlin Wall cultural affinity and moral purpose have declined as major factors in
the relationship.29 Central to US-German relations is the high volume of German and
American exports and the concern, despite sporadic EU-USA trade quarrels, that these should
be allowed to flourish in an open but fair market. While globalisation has placed new and
increased demands on national diplomacy, the wide range of common interests which exist
between the EU and the USA have necessitated close ties which are in turn reflected in the
maintenance of security co-operation. 'Guarded engagement' rather than isolationism will be
the hallmark of US foreign policy in the future.30
GERMAN POLITICS10
The development of the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within the
Atlantic Alliance has been central to the incremental recasting of the transatlantic relationship
during the 1990s. The declaration of the North Atlantic Council in Brussels on 10-11 January
1994 stated that the emergence of the ESDI was an ' expression of a mature Europe' 31 and
supported the creation of  ' separable but not separate capabilities which could respond to
European requirements and contribute to alliance security.' 32 Most significantly in this
declaration, NATO assets were to be made available for WEU operations through the
Common Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept. Ginsberg suggests that the efforts of the EU in the
field of CFSP alleviated considerable tensions between the EU and the USA.33 In addition, the
range of options open to both the WEU and NATO were enhanced. The North Atlantic
Council summits at Madrid in 1997 and Washington in 1999 elaborated the principles of
ESDI. While ESDI has been central to raising the profile of Western Europe within NATO,
the United States has been very sure to maintain it position as primus inter pares at the head
of the Alliance. The military capabilities gap between the United States and European NATO
members means that the final decision on future NATO military operations will remain with
America.
CURRENT ISSUES FACING GERMAN POLICY-MAKERS IN CFSP
The Kosovo conflict in 1999 provided an important impetus for greater European co-
operation in the field of foreign and defence policy. This commitment to the European
integration process was emphasised by Chancellor Schröder during the conflict in order to
secure public support for German involvement in the bombing of Serbia: 'The integration of
Germany into the Western community of states is part of the German Staatsräson. We do not
want a German Sonderweg'.34 However, the new German governments stance has changed
subtly. According to Schröder, the new German foreign policy wont be unhistorical. But I
believe we have shown in the past 50 years that there is no reason to tie down the Germans,
out of fear of the furum teutonicus  My generation and those following are Europeans
because we want to be, not because we must be. That makes us freer in dealing with others.35
This view is mirrored in the opinion of one of the Chancellors advisers who stated that he
wanted a Europe which is 'worthwhile for Germans.'36 In the words of Hellmann, 'in
Germany's policy towards European integration (as in no other area) Germany's domestic
discourse about "national" interests has markedly shifted during the past decade  from a
position of supranationalism and "inhibitedness"  based on both Germany's post-war
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enthusiasm for European integration and its pre-World War II legacy of "Machtpolitik" to a
more self-centred, assertive and more "national" position.'37
This new Euro-pragmatism has not manifested itself in the area of CFSP as it has in
other areas of European integration.38 The fierce debate over the introduction of EMU
(Economic and Monetary Union) is the clearest case study of the waning of the previously
unquestioned public consensus on the merits of European integration. Nonetheless there
remains broad public support for an enhanced European Union security presence and
Germany's responsibility within such a project. Debates on European security in Germany
centre on what kind of role Germany should have in any future autonomous European
security capability. In many ways, the German public is still wedded to the concept of the
Bundeswehr as a purely defensive force. However, Germany must now be bündnisfähig
(capable of fulfilling the obligations of military alliance membership) and shoulder
considerably more responsibility in military operations, as in the bombing of Serbia. The
ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty improves the operability of the CFSP by improving
decision-making processes, especially by removing the need for unanimous voting in some
areas. These developments aimed at increasing solidarity within CFSP by allowing 'coalitions
of the willing' to carry out common missions without the need for involvement of all member
states. It is this area where Germany's new stance towards Europe is arguably most evident.
According to Duke, the provisions contained within the Amsterdam Treaty 'might even
encourage national-interest-driven foreign and security policy as opposed to the "mutual
solidarity" sought by the treaty.' 39 This is a scenario which Germany will guard against.
The development of the CESDP since the Cologne European Council Summit in June
1999 presents German policy-makers with two important choices. The first relates to the
direction in which Germany wants the EU's foreign policy to develop and the extent of the
constraints on this policy. Second, Germany must decide what the EUs future role should be.
Germany has been described as a Zivilmacht (civilian power), relying on military means only
as a last resort, but this categorisation is open to question in the light of recent developments
in Kosovo.40 However, Germany appears reluctant to commit to further military involvement
in multilateral task forces, while at the same time remaining very aware of its responsibilities
as a NATO and EU member. The uneasiness that remains within Germany concerning the
deployment of the Bundeswehr for anything other than peacekeeping operations may result in
behind-the-scenes efforts to convince its main EU partners of the merits of a minimalist
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foreign and security policy in terms of the use of military force. Foreign Minister Fischer has
been vocal in expressing his continuing view of the EU as a Zivilmacht.41 For Fischer the
development of a European security and defence capability is not about a militarisation of the
EU, rather the EU must be made an effective and decisive peaceful power which is able, as
was the case in Kosovo, to bolster the rule of law and renounce violence and thereby to
consign war as a political tool in Europe to the past.42  This view is backed by Angelika Beer,
defence spokesperson for Alliance'90/The Greens, who maintains that 'the civilian power
character of the European Union should not be lost.' 43 While Germany is committed to the
development of the CESDP and to react to American calls to take more responsibility in its
'own backyard', the transatlantic link will continue to exert an important gravitational pull.
However, a reluctance to develop the CESDP further may lead to frustrations on the part of
France and the UK, which feel more comfortable in resorting to armed force. In the changing
post-Cold War environment, the CESDP can provide Germany with a multilateral solution for
its evolving security needs.
If the CFSP should be truly communitarised (brought into the main treaty structure
and put under greater supranational control) and the EU is enlarged to perhaps 28 countries,
this would certainly further enhance the EU's role as the most dynamic force on the continent
of Europe. Communitarisation of the CFSP implies a common defence budget, greater
involvement in CFSP affairs by the European Parliament, the subjection of CFSP to the
scrutiny of the European Court of Justice, and, in the last resort, perhaps even supranational
control of troops in the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF).44 Extensive enlargement will
inevitably signal a dramatic evolution of the EU's geopolitical role in the international
system.45 With this would come added responsibility. The EU might want or have to go it
alone without American involvement  a scenario which would pose Germany with tough
choices. Ultimately, the EU's enormous economic strength and military potential may lead the
EU down the path towards becoming a global power to match the United States and the
emerging China.
There has been a notable growth in tension between the United States and the EU in
recent times, primarily in economic affairs, but security-related tensions have also been in
evidence.46 The latter have sprung not only from US exasperation at the lack of a European
capability in security matters, but also from hints from some European quarters at the
development of autonomous European security structures.47 On a similar line, the EU has also
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been more concerned about the destabilising impact of Russia on the continent as a whole and
has made efforts to bolster co-operation and transparent relations with Russia.48 In addition,
Europeans have been very critical of plans for a US missile shield. This issue is particularly
relevant for Germany and its security needs because of the non-nuclear character of German
defence. Germanys reliance on the United States for a nuclear shield, according to Fischer,
' was always based on our trust that the United States would protect out interests, that the
United States, as the leading nuclear power, would guarantee some sort of order.'49 Clinton's
postponement of a decision on the National Missile Defence (NMD) system has been
welcomed by Fischer, 50 but Republicans seem determined to implement the programme, even
to the extent of expanding its scope to cover Western Europe.
The main problem with NMD is that it is a fundamentally flawed project with little
chance of success. There has been no serious dialogue between both sides of the transatlantic
alliance over the proposals. NMD is an elite-driven programme which has not been
sufficiently 'sold'  to either the US public or America's European allies.51 Despite the ultimate
aim of extending the NMD to cover Western Europe, the row over NMD is significant in that
it shows up a lack of communication within NATO over the future security provision for the
West. This issue is all the more unwelcome because it has emerged at a time when the
security architecture is being reorganised to cope with the new demands facing Europe.
Transparency and co-ordination within the EU and NATO over future burden-sharing is a
prerequisite for the success of any military intervention under ESDP. There must be a two-
way process of mutual reassurance in which Europe will be confident of the continued
American commitment to European security. In addition, the United States will have to learn
to overcome what Lord Robertson has called a sort of schizophrenia' over ESDP, in which it
seems to welcome moves for a more balanced division of labour in defence matters, while at
the same time remaining anxious that a more autonomous European capability could lead to
the weakening of transatlantic ties.52
What causes most friction between the US and its European Allies is America's
continued unipolar vision of the world and its own leadership role in it. Lindley-French
identifies  the root cause of this as being that America is incapable of true partnership
because Americans, regardless of political persuasion, feel obliged to lead.'53 This propensity
will inevitably cause major difficulties within transatlantic security relations as the EU's
presence in the international community grows and it begins to act more assertively in
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security affairs.  The EU may increase its influence within the Atlantic Alliance, but, while
this will give it a greater say in policy matters, the USA remains so far ahead in terms of
military capabilities and in the technological Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) that
America will remain the dominant partner for the foreseeable future.54 Concerns have been
voiced within Germany that the future European capability might be a shield for Europe, but
not America's sword.'55 The development of a potentially semi-autonomous crisis reaction
force, as outlined in the Helsinki Council Declaration in December 1999, has been one of the
major issues within the Atlantic Alliance and the EU during the 1990s. Javier Solana has
stated that 'putting practical military strength at the top of our agenda should reassure our
North American Allies. We are doing what they have urged us to do for decades.'56
Calls have been coming from the USA, particularly from the Republican camp, for a
clear division of labour between America and Europe, with the US focusing on fighting or
preventing wars in the Persian Gulf and Asia, leaving the European states to concentrate on
peacekeeping missions. Generally, the Europeans are more willing to commit ground troops
in peacekeeping situations than the American. Bearing the legacy of Vietnam, the US prefers
to focus on issues which impinge on America's geopolitical role rather than on regional
disputes of the kind witnessed in the Balkans. However, such a division of labour and burden-
sharing may not be in the best interests of alliance cohesion.
A key indicator of Germany's determination to help concretely in the development of
the CESDP will be the fate of efforts to reform the Bundeswehr. Schake et al. note the need
for Germany to modernise and professionalise its army and, in particular, its crisis reaction
troops in order to make a satisfactory contribution.57 This is a very sensitive issue. Hoffmann
and Longhurst argue that:
Essentially, the idea of an All Volunteer Force (AVF) does not 'fit in' with what the
Germans see as being the role and purpose of their armed forces. The practice of
conscription in Germany has profound meaning, stretching beyond military necessity,
party politics and an attachment to economic benefits delivered by Zivildienst ...
Conscription is clearly viewed by the mainstream parties as a mechanism to resist
fundamental change in Germany's security policies by maintaining a healthy
equilibrium and broad interface in civil-military relations.58
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This evolution in defence and security policy within Germany, while not representing a
complete divorce from past German preferences and reluctance to engage in military
operations, has impacted on the wider political environment. What would have been
politically impossible in the immediate wake of unification can now be justified by German
elites in terms of multilateral commitments and the maintenance of international human rights
norms. German strategic culture defines the realms of the possible and thereby the constraints
under which German policy-makers must operate. Longhurst has described the make-up of
strategic culture as a range of discernible norms, beliefs and ideas which act as a perceptual
lens through which objective reality is processed and translated into understandable "facts".'59
Strategic culture is, however, an evolving concept, which can be seen in the development of a
consensus over the need for a greater European voice in foreign and security policy. This is a
case of what Aggestam identifies as 'Complex Learning'  - actors going through a process of
social learning in which their values and beliefs are altered through continuous interaction.60
CHALLENGES FACING GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY ELITES  EUROPE AS A FREE RIDER ON
AMERICAN  MILITARY STRENGTH? 61
An analysis of the Balkan Stability Pact is a key indicator of how Germany would like to
develop the CFSP. Joschka Fischer invested significant political capital in pressing for EU
action in this area. The significance of the Stability Pact for the future of Europe for German
policy-makers is very evident in Fischers remarks that with the Stability Pact we must prove
that we mean business with our commitment. This is also a question of the political reliability
of Germany and Europes foreign policy.62
Germany also framed the initial efforts to develop a Stability Pact as being in the national
interest. 'Due to Germany's pronounced interest in stability in the region, Germany along with
its EU partners should undertake the initiative to provide a middle to long-term strategy for
the stabilisation of South-east Europe.' 63 The desire evident here to communitarise a German
initiative is typical of German European policy-making.
It is noteworthy that major advances towards CESDP were made at the Cologne
Council summit. The fleshing out of Fischer's proposals for the Stability Pact for the South-
east Balkans marked a clear determination to achieve a better co-ordination of the European's
non-military crisis reaction capabilities.64 Germany's ability to conduct a successful European
Council Presidency in CFSP matters was further bolstered by the entry into force of the
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Amsterdam Treaty on 1 May 1999. The adoption of Fischer's proposals to bring stability to
the South-east Balkans was greatly facilitated by the new institutional possibilities created by
the new treaty. Clearly, Germany's diplomacy was successful because it acted in accordance
with its stated aim to utilise CFSP structures to the full.
Germany would nonetheless prefer the CESDP not to become an institution which
demands too much from Berlin. Although Germany has progressed politically along the path
towards assuming greater responsibilities in military operations, this movement has not been
backed by a complementary reform of the armed forces.65 Germany has evidently undergone
a process of 'foreign policy learning during the 1990s, but there may be limits to this
process.66 Hence Germany has sought to influence EU security policy in the direction of non-
military endeavours in which political co-operation is more important than military
intervention. Germany saw the Stability Pact as a necessary balance to the bombing of
Kosovo, as compensation for the destruction which the bombing caused in the region. The
Stability Pact may also be viewed as an attempt to gain diplomatic prestige and present a
positive image of their European Council Presidency in the first half of 1999. In addition, the
appointment of Bodo Hombach as head of the Stability Pact was also a politically expedient
move by Schröder to remove a controversial politician from the German domestic stage.
A second major issue which German policy-makers must address is whether Germany
should support the communitarisaton of the CFSP, so that EU would replace national control
of what is traditionally one of the most jealously guarded areas of national sovereignty.
Germany is considered in some quarters a post-national state that is comfortable with the
ceding of sovereignty to supranational institutions.67 But the machinery of decision-making in
this area may not be easily transferable to the EU, not even for the Federal Republic. Joschka
Fischer clearly sees the ceding of national sovereignty in this area to the EU as a vital part of
the integration project. Thus, in a recent speech to the German Bundestag, he stated: The
completion of this Europe of integration means  the transfer of the substantial sovereign
rights of nation states to the political scope of the European Union  If you want that, then
the military level will not remain with the nation-state  Without this development we
cannot complete the political goal of a European Union.68
German policy-makers stand out among those of the  'big three' member states in pushing for
political union with the inclusion of CESDP structures within the main EU body. France,
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while being a vocal supporter of deeper integration, will continue to insist on an
intergovernmental approach to EU security affairs, albeit not in the strictest sense of the word.
The UK, due to the politically extremely contested character of European integration in
Britain, would find it very difficult to go down the road of greater supranational control of
CESDP. In terms of Putnam's two-level game metaphor, British policy elites are constrained
at the international level by ratification difficulties on the domestic level which restrict the
scope of policy choices which are acceptable to it at the EU negotiating table.69
Fischer's federalist vision of the future of the EU will inevitably clash with
intergovernmentalist conceptions in the UK. One may also ask what impact a communitarised
ESDP would have on bilateral relations between Germany and the United States. As defence
is perhaps the most difficult policy area to communitarise, the CESDP would almost certainly
be the final piece in the jigsaw of political union. A more cohesive and powerful EU could put
pressure on EU-US relations. Even if this were the case, however, the transatlantic strategic
partnership is not a zero-sum game; so the development of a more cohesive and effective
CESDP should not dramatically affect security relations.
For Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping, the aim of a common security policy must be
that Europe speaks with one voice in international affairs and is in the position to decide
upon and represent its interests.70 Moreover, Europe must be politically and militarily
authorised to act and take responsibility for European security itself.71  Scharping has
stressed particularly the need for coordination to avoid costly duplications of resources and
proposed the establishment of a Joint Air Transport Command, an area where Europe is
especially weak. Scharping in fact proposed the creation of a European Defence Ministers'
Council, which had its first informal session in Sintra, Portugal in February 2000, discussing
future EU decision-making structures and the strengthening of military capabilities. This
informal meeting of Defence Ministers will be backed up by interim military committees as
well as by a delegation of national military experts in the EU Council secretariat. These
measures were agreed by EU Foreign Ministers in February 2000. Moves have also been
made by Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Sweden to streamline European defence
industries. These countries signed a framework agreement for the Organisation for Joint
Armament Co-operation (OCCAR), a step which the US sees as unwelcome.72
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Scharping has also been trying to streamline existing institutions and to improve
overall co-ordination in the field of foreign and security policy. The latter concern accounts
for his initiative to stage regular, if informal, meetings of Member States' defence ministers,
building on the 1998 Pörtschach summit. Scharping also supported the establishment of a
Political Security Committee (PSC) in the same building as the EU Council of Ministers.
Scharping has, however, been hampered in pursuing his policies by substantial cuts in the
defence budget, cuts which will hinder his attempts to modernise the Bundeswehr. The reform
of the Bundeswehr 73 has provoked intense inter-party debate within Germany, with the
CDU/CSU favouring an increase in the defence budget in order to meet the new security
demands. The Bavarian CSU has stated that 'the austerity plans of the Red/Green coalition for
the German Federal Armed Forces put Germany and its defence capabilities into last place
behind its European partners' and that the budget should be raised to DM 50 billion.74 The
opposition parties argue that Bundeswehr numbers should not fall below 300,000.75
Government and opposition accept the need for the Bundeswehr to remain bündnisfähig, but a
debate is raging in Germany about how this should be achieved.76 By reducing still further the
ability of the Bundeswehr to conduct unilateral operations, the Red/Green government hopes
to increase the dependency of the German military on multilateralism. However, there is
uneasiness in both the US and the UK that Germany is really only adapting to current
perceived security threats and is not investing in its armed forces as it should to meet the
challenges of the future.
What is clear in any case is that the major military member states - France, the UK and
Germany - are taking the lead  in the preparation of the CESDP. This has led to tension within
the EU, especially with the smaller states, which are not always consulted on such matters.77
The use of directoires may become a more frequent occurrence within the CESDP as the
necessity for swift and decisive action grows. Germany feels slightly uncomfortable about its
position in the directoire, as this conflicts with its role as a Musterknabe (model pupil)
supporting deeper European integration. It will not therefore want to draw attention to its
growing responsibilities within CESDP.
German policy towards the CESDP is affected by competition and conflict between
different ministries with their different agendas. Bulmer et al. point to the clash between the
foreign and finance ministries, the former with its positive sum conceptions' of integration
and the latter with its 'cost-cutting' ethos.78 These antagonistic priorities have provoked
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clashes within the government over CESDP and notably huge row over the Bundeswehr
budget, in which cuts were imposed by Finance Minister Eichel. This inter-ministerial
wrangling over the future financing of the Bundeswehr was seen outside Germany as a blow
to the prospect of developing a viable and powerful European defence force. NATO
Secretary-General Lord Robertson, while still UK Defence Secretary, was especially critical
of the budget cuts, stating that: The days of cutting defence budgets are over There can be
no peace dividend without peace. That is going to dawn on some countries.'79 This view was
echoed by the US Defence Secretary, William Cohen, who asserted that now more than ever
the alliance looks to German leadership to contribute to the capabilities necessary if we are to
continue shaping peace and security into the next century.'80 However, any suggestion of a
German leadership role is viewed with concern by German policy-makers:  'We do not want
to dance alone, but rather be the driver of further integration.'81 At the 73rd Franco-German
summit in Toulouse, Schröder and Chirac stressed their 'determination to contribute all their
weight so that the EU equips itself with the necessary autonomous means to decide and deal
with crises.'82 The momentum behind Germany's decision to play a larger role in crisis
management seems now to be firmly grounded.
The Foreign Ministry under Joschka Fischer actively supports the CESDP,
emphasising, for example, as in the Stability Pact, the need for the extension of human rights
and democracy to Southern Europe.  Despite his unorthodox political background in the
Green movement, the pressures of high office have forced Fischer to make concessions and
prevented  any significant 'greening' of German security policy. Although Fischer has
supported the commitment to form a 50-60,000-strong ERRF by 2003, his main emphasis,
under pressure from the fundamentalist element of the Alliance'90/The Greens, has been on
promoting non-military aspects of security. In contrast, Scharping's ministry is ingrained with
a pro-NATO stance stemming from the long years of the Bundeswehrs integration into
NATO forces and is therefore more likely to emphasis 'hard security' measures.
How much room for manoeuvre does Germany have in the pursuit of new security
policies? The upgrading of the European voice and capabilities in regional security issues
presents Germany with a new set of priorities and policy choices. The decisions taken by the
EU to develop a crisis reaction force were strongly backed by Germany, even though this will
result in the increasing use of the Bundeswehr in military operations. There remains distinct
unease among the German public concerning the use of the Bundeswehr, despite the relative
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'success' of German involvement in Kosovo. Scharping's commitment at the informal Defence
Ministers meeting at Ecouen in October 2000 to provide approximately 18,000 troops for the
ERRF, almost a third of the total force numbers, signals a great commitment by Germany.
The real test, however, will come when the fledgling force takes part in its first military
operations. Will the German public continue to support this project if the Bundeswehr suffers
losses on the front line?
CONCLUSION
Some initial conclusions can be drawn concerning Germany's evolving CESDP stance.
First, Joschka Fischer advocates the development of a CESDP founded on the ideals of
Zivilmacht, stressing non-military aspects of security in Europe. The Stability Pact is an
example of Fischer's emphasis on democracy-building, economic development and respect for
humanity as a means of securing stability. This is a clear example of Germany placing its
imprint on the CESDP process. Second, this emphasis on non-military security and
preventative security measures has affected the German government's decision to cut the
defence budget. In defence matters, there appears to be an attempt in some quarters to cling to
fundamental principles of  the German strategic culture to brake attempts to improve the
deployment capabilities of the Bundeswehr. This sends mixed signals to Germany's partners
and will continue to result in frustration and tensions unless this issue is resolved. Finally, the
broad political consensus favouring an enhanced European capability in foreign and security
policy will almost certainly be put under pressure if Germany does develop a stronger military
capability and the preference that existed hitherto in favour of non-military crisis prevention is
thereby undermined.
Notwithstanding the recent growth of tensions in the Atlantic Alliance, German
policy-makers still look to the US to provide Germanys nuclear shield.  Germany will
therefore continue to pursue a British-style approach  to European security aiming at
enhancing the European voice within NATO rather than at trying to build up a rival venture.
The principal CESDP dilemma for Germany is whether it wants to create new machinery for
CESDP without first having a clear vision as to how it is going to be used.  If Germany cannot
affect the process as much as it would like, then it will be forced to make difficult decisions
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concerning military operations. Performing the Petersberg Tasks, which have been
incorporated into the CESDP, will not be easy for the EU, but will rather require a substantial
commitment by the member states, including Germany.
The EUs Nice Summit in December 2000  advanced the CESDP further by forging
agreement over the broad aims of EU security policy.83 Despite accounts of a dispute between
France and the United Kingdom over the relationship between the CESDP and NATO, a 60-
page report outlining the plans for the ERRF was unanimously agreed after only eight minutes
of discussions.84 However, the UK's success in not having defence issues come under
'enhanced co-operation' may brake future development of the CESDP. While the relationship
between the EU and NATO remains slightly hazy, there has been enough convergence of
views on the subject to allow progress on CESDP to be made. The evolving compromise
between pro-Atlanticists and pro-Europeanists has been the key to the development of the
CFSP during the 1990s.
Germany remains pre-occupied by the task of balancing its relations with its European
partners with its relations with the United States. American pragmatism and the USs strategic
interests will keep the US involved in European security affairs. Germany will continue to
push to have its voice heard in security policy negotiations with its major partners to ensure
that German interests are considered and that Germany can play an active part in CESDP. For
Germany to keep pace with the inevitable consequences of the recasting of the transatlantic
security bargains which is under way, German elites must continue to secure domestic
approval for a more active role in military operations. To succeed in this, policy-making elites
must try to explain, justify and legitimise  the role of CESDP in Europe and Germany's
security policy. In any case, the current discussions over the future shape of European security
institutions cannot be considered as a zero-sum game in which the development of CESDP
automatically affects and reduces the quality of transatlantic relations between the USA,
Germany, France and the UK. The transatlantic strategic partnership will continue to exist but
in a revised form in which Europe will carry more of the burden in crisis management. Thus,
the recasting of security bargains post-Kosovo does not  really pose a threat to existing
security relations. Rather, this process reflects new geopolitical realities and the new quality
of defence co-operation within the EU.
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